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Book Reviews

that the South shared many modern, capitalist
characteristics with the North. Southern railroads faced some of the same business challenges as their northern counterparts and
responded with similar rhetorical and technological solutions. Thomas uses  and statistical analysis to demonstrate that the level of
railroad access for the South’s free population
nearly matched that of northerners while the
number of depots and junctions per capita in
the South exceeded that in the North.
As anyone who has ever confronted an email inbox after a week’s vacation knows,
however, digital technology can have its disadvantages. One of the most common is an
overwhelming amount of information. This
book is packed with so much information that
Thomas sometimes loses the thread of his
argument while exploring material that is
interesting but not clearly related to what precedes or follows it. Still, very few people are
willing to renounce digital technology because
of overstuffed e-mail inboxes. Thomas’s skillful use of innovative new research tools shows
why—the beneﬁts and insights such technology can provide are substantial.
Robert G. Angevine
George Washington University
Washington, D.C.
doi: 10.1093/jahist/jas478

The Body of John Merryman: Abraham Lincoln
and the Suspension of Habeas Corpus. By
Brian McGinty. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011. 253 pp. $29.95.)
Abraham Lincoln and Treason in the Civil
War: The Trials of John Merryman. By Jonathan W. White. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 2011. xvi, 191 pp. Cloth,
$49.95. Paper, $18.95.)
Governments jail people who are perceived as
threats. More often than not the governments
believe the threats to be genuine and the
incarcerations to be legally sound. But governments are sometimes wrong. When a court
issues a writ of habeas corpus (also known as
the Great Writ of Liberty), it orders jailers to
bring a prisoner into court and requires them
to persuade a neutral judicial ofﬁcer of the
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correctness of their legal and factual assertions,
or else release the captive. Unsurprisingly,
jailers frequently resist being called to account.
Much of the Anglo-American history of the
rule of law has been shaped by the resolution
of the resulting clashes.
One frequently recounted episode is the centerpiece of both books under review. As Union
troops rushed to Washington, D.C., in April
1861, many Southern sympathizers violently
opposed their passage. The leader of a Maryland cavalry unit, John Merryman, ordered the
destruction of several key railroad bridges to
prevent additional Northern units from passing
through Baltimore. It remains contested to this
day whether he did so as an act of hostility or,
with the concurrence of the local authorities, in
good faith to forestall further violence. In any
event, Union military ofﬁcers considered his
actions treasonous, placed him under arrest, and
conﬁned him to Fort McHenry.
Merryman’s counsel sought a writ of habeas
corpus from Chief Justice Roger Taney, who
ordered that the commanding general produce
Merryman in court and justify the detention.
Gen. George Cadwalader instead sent a letter
informing a surprised Taney that President
Abraham Lincoln had authorized Cadwalader
to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, that he
had done so, and that therefore neither the
prisoner nor an explanation for his detention
would be forthcoming. In Ex Parte Merryman
(1861), Taney denounced the putative suspension as unconstitutional and expressed the
pious hope that Lincoln, with whom he had
long been bitterly at odds, would correct the
situation. Lincoln instead publicly defended
his actions, and Merryman remained in military confinement.
Readers whose primary interest is history
rather than law will ﬁnd Jonathan W. White’s
monograph a more valuable consideration of
these events than Brian McGinty’s. White,
who teaches American studies at Christopher
Newport University, has written a vivid and
impressively researched account particularly noteworthy for its scrupulous reliance on primary
sources. He even uncovers a previously unpublished letter by Merryman explaining his actions.
White treats the events of spring 1861 as
part of two wider stories: the story of Merryman’s continuing involvement with the criminal
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and civil legal system as a result of the burning
of the bridge; and the story of the fate of thousands of other prisoners detained by unilateral
executive decision, frequently in deﬁance of the
commands of Congress and the courts. The
ﬁrst of these stories illuminates the practical difﬁculties faced by the constituted authorities and
their adversaries in attempting to vindicate their
respective claims through legal mechanisms that
had been created long ago under completely different conditions. The second story is
familiar thanks to the work of Mark E. Neely
Jr., but developments since September 11,
2001, make it particularly timely for us to recall
the sheer radicalism of Lincoln’s position. He
claimed and exercised both the power to detain
civilians preventatively, incarcerating them until
the end of the conﬂict to forestall any harm
they might do, and the power to try to punish
them by military tribunals for an ill-deﬁned
range of conduct thought to be inimical to the
war effort. Lincoln believed, White argues, that
he “had a war to ﬁght and a nation to save and
he would not allow himself or his administration to be hamstrung by another branch’s interpretation of the suspension clause” of the
Constitution (article 1, section 9, clause 2)
(p. 75).
Readers whose primary interest is the various
legal arguments spawned at the time by Lincoln’s views should turn to the extended summaries provided in the work of McGinty, a
lawyer who has previously published books in
the ﬁeld. The salient feature of his book is its
insistence on the degree to which legal doctrines inﬂuenced events in the outside world.
McGinty adopts the political scientist Carl
Brent Swisher’s view that Ex Parte Merryman
“had the impact of a military victory for the
South,” and continues: “That the victory did
not carry the South to ultimate independence
is due in large measure to the answers Lincoln
provided to Taney’s Merryman arguments”
( pp. 7–8). That is a strong statement—conventional wisdom is surely that the North
would have prevailed militarily regardless of
how Lincoln had responded to the ruling—
and one that the author’s generally unremarkable narrative fails to prove.
McGinty compounds the difﬁculty of promising in argument more than he delivers in evidence by asserting that “after the guns of war
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ﬁnally fell silent, the suspension was sustained
and the Union was saved” (p. 9). His account
of subsequent decisions during the period
shows a more mixed record. As history, that
section is also marred by the insertion of commentary on the Supreme Court’s cases during
the current war on terror without even a sidelong glance at the legal lessons of World War I
as taught by its First Amendment cases, of
World War II as taught by its Japanese internment cases, or the Korean War as taught by
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952).
Both authors agree that we live in a different
legal world than Lincoln did and that, even so,
Lincoln was often ambivalent about pushing
the legal envelope. He most likely hoped that
his successors would understand his broad
abrogation of civil liberties to secure victory as
an instance of “winning ugly.” It was preferable
to defeat but not an example to emulate.
Eric M. Freedman
Hofstra University Law School
Hempstead, New York
doi: 10.1093/jahist/jas369

The Peninsula Campaign and the Necessity of
Emancipation: African Americans and the Fight
for Freedom. By Glenn David Brasher.
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 2012. 288 pp. $39.95.)
Mark Grimsley argued in Hard Hand of War
(1995) that the 1862 Peninsula Campaign
was the turning point in the creation of the
Federal hard war policy. Glenn David Brasher
zeroes in on the campaign’s impact regarding
one part of that policy, emancipation, and,
unlike Grimsley, he extensively explores it.
Brasher maintains that Confederate use of
numerous slaves to build fortifications contributed to the failure of the Federal invasion
under Gen. George McClellan, an opponent
of Union interference with slavery. According
to Brasher, McClellan’s inability to end the
war, exaggerated tales about Confederate use
of slave soldiers, the large number of slaves
fleeing to Federal forces, and the Union
troops’ receptivity to them because of their usefulness enabled the Radical Republicans to convince a formerly reluctant President Abraham
Lincoln to issue an emancipation proclamation.
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